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This study examined the effects of sensitivity, specificity and 
result of diagnostic tests on the uses which physicians make of those 
results. These were compared with the Bayesian model of probabilty 
adjustment, which is generally accepted for medical diagnosis. 
Ninety six active members of the Oregon Academy of Family 
Physicians were interviewed by telephone, using a case scenario 
describing a patient with a newly discovered breast lump. Subjects 
estimated prior probability of malignancy, based on history and 
~ 
2 
physical findings, and then estimated posterior probability following 
results of a mammogram. Mammograms varied by result (positive 
or negative) and by high and low values for sensitivity and 
specificity. Subjects were asked to indicate their confidence in each 
probability estimate. About one third of the subjects were also 
asked for their treatment threshold -- that point at which they 
would change from a policy of watchful waiting to one of taking some 
action, which was usually biopsy of the lesion. 
Subjects who received positive test results made greater 
probability adjustments (F(l,88)=12.89, p<.001). No other factors 
affected the magnitude of change. The accuracy of probability 
adjustment, compared to the Bayesian model, was also affected by 
test result (F(l ,88)=21.07, p<.001 ), with overadjustment by subjects 
who received positive results and underadjustment by subjects who 
received negative results. Test specificity also affected accuracy 
(F(l,88)=5.26, p<.025), as did interaction between result and 
specificity (F(l,88)=4.56, p<.05). Subjects who received positive test 
results showed greater confidence increase in their revised estimates 
(F(l,88)=13.06, p<.001). The results suggest a tendency to be 
influenced by caution in avoidance of a false negative diagnosis. The 
departure from normative probability adjustment also indicates lack 
of understanding of the importance of test accuracy in the disease-
absent condition. By comparing subjects' revised probabilities with 
Bayesian revised probabilities, relative to the treatment threshold, it 
was concluded that over 20% of the practicing physicians in this 
study would have more effective treatment plans if they understood 
better the process of probability revision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Physicians are expected to make decisions with a consistently 
high level of accuracy, as errors of judgment may lead to serious 
consequences for their patients and for themselves. Despite 
expectations of "superhuman" performance, they bring to their 
professional tasks the cognitive abilities and disabilities possessed by 
any other human judge. The purpose of this study was to examine 
some of the human cognitive limitations as part of the process of 
medical diagnosis. The diagnostic task under scrutiny was revision 
of the probability of disease, based on the results of a medical test. 
In their article describing problems and techniques in the 
diagnostic process, Schechter and Sheps (1985) proposed the 
following first two principles of diagnostic decision analysis: (1) "In 
the diagnostic context, patients do not have disease, only a 
probability of disease. (2) Diagnostic tests are merely revisions of 
probabilities." Errors in reasoning--specifically in revising the 
probability of disease--may seriously reduce the quality of medical 
care. Serious consequences of overtreatment or undertreatment may 
arise from errors in determining on which side of the "treatment 
threshold" (a concept describing the cutoff point at which a physician 
decides whether or not a patient should be treated) a patient's 
probability of disease falls (Eddy, 1982). This treatment threshold is 
analogous to the "critical ratio" discussed by Fischoff and Beyth-
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Marom ( 1983) as that point on the posterior probability continuum 
which is the "threshold for translating posterior odds into action" (p. 
250). 
Bayes' Theorem as a Model for Medical Decision Making 
The process of revising the probability of disease can be 
described as hypothesis evaluation. In its most general terms, a 
hypothesis (H) is evaluated in the light of a new datum (D), which 
provides evidence for or against the hypothesis. Bayesian inference 
is an accepted normative model for hypothesis evaluation (Fischoff & 
Beyth-Marom, 1983) and human inference (Kozielecki, 1970). Cast m 
terms of (H), and (D), it reads 
P(DIH) X P(H) 
P(HID) = (1) 
[P(DIH) X P(H)] + [P(Dl-H) X P(-H)] 
where P(HID) is the probability that the hypothesis is true, given the 
datum; P(DIH) is the probability of the datum occuring, given the 
hypothesis is true; P(H) is the prior probability of the hypothesis 
being true; P(Dl-H) is the probability of the datum occuring, given the 
hypothesis is false; and P(-H) is the prior probability that the 
hypothesis is false. 
Ledley and Lusted (1959) were among the first to introduce 
the Bayesian formula for probability revision into medical literature 
as a model for medical diagnosis. By recasting the formula in terms 
of evaluating the hypothetical presence of disease (D+) and the result 
of a finding, in this case a positive test result (T + ), the formula now 
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reads 
P(T +ID+) X P(D+) 
P(D+IT+) = ------------------------------------ (2a) 
[P(T +ID+) X P(D+ )] + [P(T +ID-) X P(D-)] 
where P(D+IT +) is the probability of disease given a positive test 
result, P(T +ID+) is the probability of testing positive if disease is 
present, P(D+) is the prior probability of disease, P(T +ID-) is the 
probability of testing positive if the disease is absent, and P(D-) is 
the prior probability of absence of the disease. The analogous 
formula for finding the posterior probability of disease given a 
negative test result (T-) 1s 
P(T-ID+) X P(D+) 
P(D+IT-) = (2b) 
[P(T-ID+) X P(D+)] + [P(T-ID-) X P(D-)] 
The posterior probability of disease then becomes the next 
prior probability in assessing results of new tests, new observations, 
or other new data (Pascoe, 1986). 
Bayesian inference continues in popularity as a normative 
model for diagnosis, even as methods of analyzing information 
become more sophisticated. One of the first articles in the medical 
literature to recommend decision analysis as a strategy for dealing 
with complex clinical decisions advocated Bayes' formula as a 
shortcut to be used in the diagnostic process (Schwartz, Garry, 
Kassirer, & Essig, 1973). The Bayesian process of diagnostic 
reasoning has recently been represented in the literature as 
branches on a diagnostic "tree" (Schechter & Sheps, 1985). 
The conditional probabilities of test result given disease state 
are referred to in medicine as the sensitivity and specificity of the 
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test. The sensitivity is the proportion of individuals with disease 
who test positive [P(T+ID+ )]; specificity is the proportion of disease-
free individuals who test negative [P(T-ID-)]. Sensitivity and 
specificity are evaluated by comparing test results against the 
presence or absence of disease as determined by a "gold standard," 
defined as a "set of criteria, external to the diagnostic test, by which 
participants are classified as diseased or not diseased" (Sheps & 
Schechter, 1984, p. 2419). By substituting these terms for their 
equivalents in formulas 2a and 2b, the formulas for updating the 
probability of disease given results of a diagnostic test now read 
(Sensitivity) X P(D+) (3a) 
P(D+IT+) = 
[(Sensitivity) X P(D+ )] + [(I-Specificity) X P(D-)] 
and 
(I-Sensitivity) X P(D+) (3b) 
P(D+IT-) = 
[(I-Sensitivity) X P(D+ )] + [(Specificity) X P(D-)]. 
To revise the probability of disease on the basis of a test result, 
it is necessary to know not only the result, but the sensitivity and 
specificity of the test when applied to that disease. The prior 
probability of the disease must be considered as well. These factors 
are mathematically interrelated, with practical implications in the 
selection and interpretation of medical tests. For example, 
decreased prior probability increases the effect of specificity on a 
positive test result (Katz, 1974; Schwartz et al., 1973). Equation 3a 
shows that the higher P(D- ), the greater the impact of the 
complement of specificity. Furthermore, specificity exerts more 
influence on the power of a positive test result to turn a diagnosis to 
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"disease present" (Connell & Koepsell, 1985; Griner, Mayewski, 
Mushlin, & Greenland, 1981 ). This is because a change in specificity 
affects only the denominator, while a change in sensitivity affects 
both the numerator and the denominator. By the same reasoning, 
sensitivity exerts more influence on the power of a negative test 
result to tum a diagnosis to "disease absent". 
In summary, specificity has more effect on a positive test than 
sensitivity, and sensitivity has more effect on a negative test than 
specificity. A positive test has more effect if the prior probability 1s 
low, and a negative test has more effect if the prior probability is 
high. Therefore, the diagnostician should seek a high-specificity test 
m a situation of low probability of disease, and a high-sensitivity test 
m a situation of high probability of disease (Griner et al, 1981; Sox, 
1986). 
For the Bayesian equation to be used properly with more than 
one observation, the observations should be conditionally 
independent (Fisch off & Beyth-Marom, 1983) -- i.e. they should not 
be correlated within either disease present or disease absent 
conditions, although they may be correlated overall. The assumption 
of independence of test results and historical/clinical observations 
may not be met in medical diagnosis (Dou bilet & McNeil, 1985; 
Hammond, Kelly, Schneider, & Vancini, 1967), and indeed is seldom 
evaluated in clinical practice (Sox, 1986). For example, it is possible 
that the sensitivity of a test may vary with clinical indications which 
led to assessment of the prior probability of disease before the 
results of the test were received. Furthermore, a test may be less 
sensitive in the early stages of disease (Sox, 1986). Both are 
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examples of conditional dependence. Wrongly assuming the 
independence of indicators and test results may lead to errors in 
determining the revised estimate of probability of disease (Pascoe, 
1986). For example, in cases where clinical indicators increase the 
sensitivity of the test, the posterior probability will be 
underestimated if this is not taken into account. There are more 
complex models of Bayesian inference which apply in situations 
where information may be dependent (Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 
1986). At this point, however, it is the simplest form of the Bayesian 
equation which is most likely to appear in the medical literature. 
Despite the complexities which arise from questions of 
conditional independence, there are many who support the use of the 
Bayesian model in medical diagnosis (Griner et al., 1981 ), at least as a 
starting point (Hammond et al., 1967). It is useful as an aid in an 
increasingly complex medical decision making environment, brought 
about by advances in medical technology techniques and therapy 
alternatives (Balla, Iansek, & Elstein, 1985). It may also remind 
clinicians to use diagnostic tests--"not as infallible technologic tools 
providing definitive answers for all patients, but as aids with which 
we may revise probabilities in individual patients" (Schechter & 
Sheps, 1985, p. 759). 
Diagnosticity and the Like1ihood Ratio. To revise a hypothesis 
(H) on the basis of a datum (D), the decision maker must compare the 
two conditional probabilities [P(DIH) and P(Dl-H)] in order to evaluate 
the evidence provided by the datum. Equation 1 can be rewritten to 
describe the odds of H as an effect of D (the ratio of how much D 
supports H to how much D supports -H) as 
P(HID)/P(-HID) = [P(DIH)/P(Dl-H)] X [P(H)/P(-H)]. 
7 
(4) 
"Diagnosticity" is a measure of how much the odds favoring H change 
as a result of D (Beyth-Marom & Fischoff, 1983). From the above 
equation, the diagnosticity of D is simply defined as P(DIH)/P(Dl-H). 
It is immediately obvious that the decision maker should seek a 
datum with the highest diagnosticity (Beyth-Marom & Fischoff, 
1983). 
This diagnosticity value is also called the "likelihood ratio" of 
the datum. In medical testing terms, the likelihood ratio of a positive 
test result (LR+) is written 
LR(T +) = (Sensitivity) I (I-Specificity). (5a) 
and the likelihood ratio of a negative test result to prove disease 1s 
LR(T-) =(I-Sensitivity) I (Specificity) (5b) 
(Doubilet, 1983). 
Schechter and Sheps ( 1985) advocate use of the likelihood ratio 
to determine the impact of a test result on the probability of disease, 
as neither sensitivity nor specificity is sufficient alone to describe a 
test's contribution to diagnosis. Considering the likelihood ratio 
helps one to understand the optimal relationship between sensitivity 
and specificity. An increase in the sum (Sensitivity + Specificity) 
leads to an increase in the "gain in certainty", which can be described 
as a measure of the change in probability (Connell & Koepsell, 1985). 
Fisch off and Beyth-Marom (1983) admonish decision makers that 
one should never ask for a piece of information whose likelihood 
ratio is equal to 1.00. Cast in medical terms, it can be seen that there 
is no gain of information when (Sensitivity + Specificity) = 1.00 
(Connell & Koepsell, 1985). 
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Clinicians as Bayesians 
Although sensitivity and specificity rates are given for many 
diagnostic tests, most clinicians do not understand how to use these 
values (Katz, 1974; Sheps & Schechter, 1984). In an informal 
"hallway encounter" survey of 60 physicians and medical students, 
Casscells, Schoenberger, and Grayboys (1978) presented a single 
hypothetical case and asked for revised probability on the basis of a 
prevalence (prior probability of disease in the population) of 1/1000 
and a positive result on a test with a "false positive rate" of 5 
percent. Although the sensitivity value was not stated, an upper 
limit of 100% sensitivity would revise the probability to be 2% or 
less. Eighteen percent of the subjects gave the correct value as their 
response. Forty five percent of the subjects returned the specificity 
value (95%) as the revised probability. The mean of all answers was 
55.9%. These results show that the meaning of specificity was not 
clearly understood, and would suggest a danger of overtreatment 
due to overestimation of the probability of disease. 
Billings and Bernstein (1985) replicated the above study seven 
years later, to see whether advances in medical training programs 
had made a difference. Performance seemed to be improved, in that 
33% made the "correct" choice ("about 2%"), compared to the 18% 
found in the earlier study. Two methodological points should be 
noted, however. This study gave subjects six multiple choice 
categories ("about 80%", "about 40%", "about 20%", "about 2%", "about 
0.01 %", and "I don't know") from which to select the correct answer, 
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as opposed to the previous study which simply asked for the correct 
answer. Furthermore, the authors did not consider that, since the 
sensitivity value must be assumed, a conscientious subject could 
have truthfully answered "I don't know." The "I don't know" answer 
was, indeed, selected by 40% of the subjects. Despite the study's 
flaws, the mean response of 30% which subjects estimated indicates 
once again a tendency toward misunderstanding and suggests a 
danger of overtreatment due to misdiagnosis. 
In a study of nurses' revisions of clinical judgments (Hammond 
et al., 1967), subjects were told to select one piece of clinical 
information at a time and to revise the probability of disease with 
each new datum. These revised probabilities were compared to 
Bayesian posterior probabilities, using sensitivity and specificity 
values which had been estimated by the subjects as their rev1s10ns 
were made. Although subjects revised their probabilities in the right 
direction, they revised them conservatively -- about 1/3 the distance 
between the prior probability and the Bayesian posterior probability. 
This was an early study in clinical diagnosis, and no attempt was 
made at separate analyses of the effects of prior probability, 
sensitivity or specificity. 
Mathematically sophisticated physicians may not perform 
much better than their colleagues. Borak and Veilleux (1982) 
compared intuitive reasoning ability of four groups: statistically 
sophisticated physicians (SP), practicing physicians (PP), clinical 
nurses (CN), and hospital laborers (HL). When asked to revise the 
probability of disease on the basis of test result, sensitivity, and 
specificity, 37% of the SP group and 78% of the PP group erroneously 
returned the sensitivity or specificity values. 
other two groups lay between these values. 
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Percentages of the 
In a study which 
compared "quantitatively sophisticated" clinicians' posterior 
probability estimates with Bayesian probability revisions (Swets, 
Feehrer, Greenes, & Bynum, 1986), the mean absolute deviation from 
the normative value was 10%. In the first experiment, subjects set 
their own likelihood ratios. When they were given the same case 
scenarios and assigned likelihood ratios, 2/3 of the subjects had 
mean estimates closer to the Bayesian values (over eight case 
scenarios), and 1/3 adjusted their estimates farther from the 
Bayesian value. 
Errors in medical probabilistic reasoning are probably not 
evenly distributed. Griner et al. (1981) showed that false positive 
clinical errors are more common than false negative errors when 
reasoning intuitively. Scheff (1971) presented a strong argument 
that medical diagnosis favors avoiding the possibility of a Type 1 
("rejecting a hypothesis which is true" or false negative) error, even 
at the expense of increased Type 2 ("accepting a hypothesis which is 
false" or false positive) errors. In a false negative error, a diseased 
patient is mistakenly classed as being disease-free; in a false positive 
error, a well patient is misdiagnosed as being diseased. Decision 
analysis and common sense may show that favoring avoidance of 
Type 1 errors is not always optimal. Casscells et al. (1978) remind 
their medical colleagues that, although the consequences of false 
negative errors may be obvious, the "mischief that derives from the 
small percentage of false positive results" may also be considerable 
(p. 1000). The consequences of unnecessary medical workups and 
1 1 
worry by the patient should not be ignored. 
Casscells et al. also express concern that a misunderstanding of 
laboratory data may contribute to the overuse of laboratory tests. 
This may become a serious problem in the profession. As a recent 
article in the medical literature stated, "The continued excessive and 
often inappropriate use of diagnostic tests should be a matter of 
concern to the entire medical community. From a wider perspective, 
these practices represent an important source of waste of limited 
resources m a time when such waste can no longer be tolerated. 
More important, from the perspective of individual patient care 
these behaviors lead to unnecessary morbidity and mortality, arising 
both from the tests themselves and from the misinterpretation of 
their results." (Schechter & Sheps, 1985, p. 759). 
Cognitive Errors in Probability Revision 
Re pre sen tati veness Bi as. Kahneman and Tversky ( 1973) 
demonstrated the phenomenon which they named 
"representativeness bias" in a series of experiments in which subjects 
overpredicted outcomes which were most representative of (similar 
to) new evidence. In these tasks, they focused on specific new-case 
information [cf. test result] and ignored the two pieces of information 
necessary to make an accurate judgment: the prior, or base-rate, 
probability that the state exists [cf. prior probability of disease], and 
the validity of the specific-case information [cf. test diagnosticity]. 
Although subjects in one of the experiments indicated that they 
thought the specific-case information had an accuracy rate of only 
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about 23% "hits", this made no difference in their overuse of the 
information. A later experiment in the series made the probability 
values [cf. sensitivity and specificity] of the specific-case information 
more salient, which resulted only in a minimal reduction in overuse 
of the information to update probability. The authors applied these 
findings to "category predictions," one example of which is medical 
diagnosis. Indeed, Balla, Elstein, and Gates ( 1983) used 
representativeness bias to account for some of the errors they found 
m a hypothetical-case-scenario study of clinical decision making. 
The Likelihood Ratio Fallacy. Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) 
suggest the term "likelihood ratio fallacy" to explain the tendency of 
judges to ignore the likelihood ratio [P(DIH) I P(Dl-H] when revising 
probability. As the likelihood ratio fallacy has a direct bearing on 
medical diagnosis, their findings, published in another article (Beyth-
Marom & Fisch off, 1983) will now be discussed in terms of medical 
testing. In the first experiment, most subjects thought P(DIH) [cf. 
sensitivity] was relevant to testing whether H was true [cf. deciding 
whether disease is present], while only about half (53.6%) judged 
P(Dl-H) [cf. specificity or its complement] to be relevant. This 
increased to 78.0% when subjects were asked to decide between H 
and -H [cf. deciding whether disease is present or absent]. Focusing 
attention on the possibility of -H [cf. disease absent] and then giving 
subjects their choice of whether to ask for P(Dl-H) increased the 
percentage of subjects who asked for that information to 70.7%. 
When asked their reasons, however, most indicated that they 
thought it was a direct indication of P(-HID) [cf. confusing the 
complement of specificity, or the probability that the test is positive 
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if disease is absent, with the posterior probability that disease is 
absent when the test is positive]. Only 20% thought that P(Dl-H) was 
necessary to assess P(HID). When they were told not to seek 
irrelevant information, only 34.5% of subjects asked for P(Dl-H) while 
most subjects continued to ask for P(DIH). Finally, the experimenters 
varied P(DIH) and P(Dl-H) [cf. sensitivity and (complement of) 
specificity] orthogonally, although two of the four possible 
combinations were nondiagnostic (likelihood ratio was 1.00). The 
prior probability was assigned. Subjects tended to adjust probability 
in the right direction (91.7%), but the experimenters do not state how 
far the adjustments were nor how they fell relative to the normative 
Bayesian value. The authors concluded that P(Dl-H) will be included 
in probability revision if it is presented equally with P(DIH), and that 
subjects are better at using the relevant information than they are at 
seeking it out or understanding why it is important. 
Covariation Assessment Errors. Judgment whether a disease is 
present or absent based on a positive or negative test result is an 
instance of covariation assessment, or judgment of the relationship 
between two states. Alloy and Tabachnik ( 1984) decomposed the 
covariation judgment process into five steps: (1) choose data to be 
considered, (2) sample, (3) classify new pieces of information as 
confirming or disconfirming evidence for the coviariation of the two 
states, ( 4) recall the data and estimate frequencies of confirming and 
discomfirming evidence, (5) make judgment on the degree of 
covariation. They cited numerous examples showing that humans 
assess covariation poorly. 
Why do errors in covariation assessment occur? Anderson, 
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Gaffuri and Morris (1986) demonstrated a "treatment-column only" 
strategy in covariation judgment.· Cast in Bayesian terms, this is 
described as attention only to the P(DIH) and P(-DIH) possibilities. 
This may be seen as a manifestation of the likelihood ratio fallacy, 
described above. In terms of medical diagnosis, it is analogous to 
attention only to test sensitivity in determining the diagnostic value 
of the result. The treatment-column strategy was proposed as an 
alternative to "confirmation bias" as an explanation of covariation 
assessment error. Confirmation bias is characterized by attention 
only to data supporting the hypothesis. In diagnostic terms, this 
would mean the number (not proportion) of patients with disease 
who test positive (it could also include the number of patients 
without disease who test negative). The dominant strategy found by 
these investigators, used by over half of their subjects, involved 
equal attention to confirming and disconfirming data and could result 
in disconfirmation of an hypothesis on the basis of a confirming 
pattern of data. 
Pseudodiagnosticity. Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney and Schiavo 
(1979) suggested a two-part explanation of errors in covariation 
judgment. Confirmation bias can explain why subjects select data 
related to only one hypothesis (H). The tendency to revise the 
probability of H on the basis only of the relationship between D and 
H, ignoring the relationship between the D and -H, was identified and 
named by the authors as "pseudodiagnosticity." This is the tendency 
to ( 1) ignore relevant information necessary to revise probability, 
and (2) revise probability on the basis of irrelevant information. 
Pseudodiagnosticity is directly applicable to diagnosis through 
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medical test results. For this reason, the findings of Doherty et al. 
( 1979) will be compared to analogous terms in medical testing in the 
following discussion. The authors demonstrated that 
pseudodiagnosticity was used as a strategy in 82% of their subjects. 
In the first experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to seek 
whatever information they thought was necessary to revise the 
probability of a hypothesis (H) [cf. that a certain disease is present] 
on the basis of new data (D) [cf. a test result]. Not only did they not 
choose information regarding P(Dl-H) [cf. (complement of) specificity], 
but they actively chose irrelevant information in the form of the 
relation between other data and H [cf. performing other tests and 
asking only for their sensitivity values with the results]. In two 
experiments in which subjects updated probability on the basis of 
one datum [cf. revising the probability of disease on the basis of one 
test result], subjects unquestioningly revised probability using only 
the relationship P(DIH) [cf. that test's sensitivity]. The authors 
suggest, as an explanation for pseudodiagnosticity, that a high 
relationship between the datum and one hypothesis implies a low 
relationship between the datum and an alternative hypothesis [high 
P(DIHl) implies low P(DIH2), or high P(DIH) implies low P(Dl-H)]. 
Fisch off and Beyth-Marom (1983) also suggested that increased 
probability of P(DIH) results in increased reliance on that information 
alone, as though it implied a decrease in P(Dl-H). In medical test 
terms, this translates to high sensitivity implying high specificity. 
In discussing the tendency of judges to attend only to P(DIH) m 
evaluating the evidence provided by a datum, Fischoff and Beyth-
Marom ( 1983) suggest that a misuse of "efficiency" in the gathering 
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of information may contribute to failure to ask questions which 
would disconfirm a hypothesis. In medicine, this would be indicated 
by ignoring the specificity value of the test. Doherty et al. (1979) 
enumerated three major consequences of pseudodiagnosticity: (1) it 
leads to premature closure in solving the problem; (2) it precludes 
the consideration of other hypothetical solutions; (3) it inhibits the 
search for other, possibly disconfirming, evidence. The parallels in 
medicine to each of these consequences might include treatment 
based on a wrong diagnosis, failure to recognize the true cause for a 
syndrome, and suboptimal selection of laboratory tests. 
Illusory Confidence. In their experiment described above 
which demonstrated poor ability to revise probability on the basis of 
specific-case and base-rate information, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973) also uncovered an alarming tendency toward high confidence 
in the erroneous predictions, measured by a subject's estimated 
probability that the answer was correct. They called this high 
confidence in fallible judgments, which often persists even when the 
fallibility is pointed out, the "illusion of validity." Perhaps one of the 
most interesting observations about this confidence is that it 
increased with perceived accuracy of the specific-case information, 
although a change in accuracy of that information did not lead to a 
change in estimated posterior probability. In medical testing, this 
would be analogous to increasing confidence on the basis of high 
sensitivity and high specificity, while not using these values 
normatively. 
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Purposes of the Study 
1. The first purpose of this study was to examine the effects of 
the sensitivity and specificity of diagnostic tests on the use which 
physicians make of the test results. The work on pseudodiagnosticity 
has been done in a hypothetical context, although the condition 
describes precisely the task of revising the probability of disease on 
the basis of a medical test result with less than 100% sensitivity and 
specificity. 
2. The effect of whether the test result was positive or 
negative was also examined. There were two reasons for this. First, 
test result is one of the determinants of whether sensitivity or 
specificity is more important. Second, an effect of test result alone 
would indicate whether representativeness bias affects the quality of 
medical diagnosis, and whether a tendency to avoid Type 1 errors 
interacts with use of diagnostic information. 
3. A final purpose of this study was to examine confidence in a 
setting of medical diagnosis, to determine whether it is affected by 
the results of diagnostic tests or by the stated validity of those tests. 
MEIBOD 
Design 
The design of this study was a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, using 
the following variables and levels within each variable: 
Subjects 
A = Test results 
1. Negative result 
2. Positive result 
B = Sensitivity of test 
1. Low (.81) 
2. High (.91) 
C = Specificity of test 
1. Low (.81) 
2. High (.91). 
Participants in the study were ninety six members of the 
Oregon Academy of Family Physicians (OAFP), a state-wide 
organization with an active, practicing membership of about 500 
physicians. The median year of graduation from medical school was 
1969 (range =1947 to 1983). Subjects had been in practice an 
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average of 17.8 years (range =1 to 38). 
Procedure 
Two hundred members of the OAFP were selected by applying 
the results of a random number generator to the membership list. 
These physicians were sent a letter from the investigator (see 
Appendix A). The letter described the purpose of the study and 
informed the physicians that they might be contacted by telephone 
and be asked to participate in the study by way of a telephone 
interview (Dillman, 1978). One week after the letters were mailed, 
telephone interviewers selected subjects sequentially from the pool 
using a randomly generated list of numbers 1-200, and began to 
make telephone calls. Almost all telephone contacts were made 
initially with a receptionist or nurse. Each encounter began with an 
introduction, a reference to the letter, and an inquiry whether the 
physician was willing to be interviewed. It was usually explained 
that the interview would take about four minutes, and was in the 
form of a case scenario with an opportunity for the physician to 
make comments. If the potential subject was willing, it was 
sometimes more practical to set up a "call back" appointment than to 
complete the interview at that time. 
Once the interviewer was speaking to the subject, the 
presentation began with the first part of a short case scenario (see 
Appendix B ), describing a female patient with a newly discovered 
breast lump. The symptoms, history and physical findings in this 
scenario were chosen on the basis of a literature review (Eddy, 1982; 
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Griner et al., 1981; Mushlin, 1985) and conversations with family 
practice physicians who were not participants in the study. The 
independence of clinical and historical indicators of breast cancer has 
not been established (Mushlin, 1985), and therefore true conditional 
probabilities cannot be assigned to each factor. Furthermore, some 
important factors were deliberately omitted, such as prior history of 
breast cancer and movability of the lump. For these reasons, a truly 
"correct" prior probability of breast cancer cannot be determined 
from the scenario. The scenario was designed, however, as a mixture 
of factors to encourage the subject to set a mid-range probability of 
breast cancer, as opposed to benign cystic disease. A mid-range 
prior probability was desired because a test result has its largest 
effect on revising probability when the prior probability is mid-
range (Sox, 1986), and the figure allowed for adjustment in both 
directions on the basis of a positive or negative test result. All 
subjects were given the same first part of the scenario. The 
interviewer then asked the subject to estimate the probability that 
the lesion was malignant. Those subjects who did not answer 
directly with a percentage figure were asked to recast their estimate 
in percent terms. Once the percent chance of malignancy was 
estimated, the subject was asked to describe his or her confidence in 
this estimate "on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'just a guess' 
and 10 means 'absolutely certain."' 
Once the subject had estimated a prior probability and 
expressed a level of confidence in that estimate, the interviewer 
selected the next available page from a randomized set of the eight 
versions of the second part of the scenario (see Appendix C for an 
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example). In this part, the results of a mammogram "ordered" by 
the subject have been returned from the radiologist as appearing 
malignant or appearing benign, along with the sensitivity and 
specificity values of mammograms in that hospital. The information 
m the second part differed among the eight combinations of 
conditions described above: negative or positive test result 
(expressed as "appears malignant" or "appears benign"), sensitivity of 
.81 or .91 and specificity of .81 or .91 (expressed as 91% or 81%). 
Sensitivity and specificity values were selected on the basis of 
congruity with the current range of mammogram validity (Mushlin, 
1985), similarity to sensitivity and specificity values which were 
used in a previous study (Griner et al., 1981 ), and the maximum 
possible divergence to keep the ranges equal yet result in different 
posterior probabilities of disease. In order to reduce as a factor the 
possible misunderstanding of the terms "sensitivity" and "specificity," 
these values were first given in sentences describing their meanings 
without using the terms. The interviewer read this part of the 
scenario, and again asked the subject to estimate the probability of 
malignancy and to describe the confidence in that estimate by the 
same techniques as those in part one. 
When about half the interviews had been completed, two 
questions were added, to be asked of subjects after the scenario was 
completed. The first question was "If you are forced to choose 
between a test with high sensitivity and one with high specificity, 
which do you tend to prefer?" Subjects were permitted to answer 
this question in whatever way they felt comfortable. The second 
question was "at what probability of breast cancer would your 
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treatment plan change from just 'watchful waiting' to actually doing 
something (such as biopsy, or whatever you would do next)?" At the 
close of the interview, all subjects were asked what year they had 
graduated from medical school, how many years they had been in 
practice, whether sensitivity and specificity values were routinely 
available to them in practice, and whether they would like to receive 
a copy of the study. 
All of the interview material was scripted, and the scripts 
served also as data collection sheets. Interviews were conducted in 
randomized blocks of eight, until 12 interviews in each condition (96 
subjects) had been completed. 
Immediately after receipt of the letter, one physician's 
receptionist called to notify the investigator that the doctor did not 
want to be contacted. Of the remaining subject pool, 150 were 
selected for telephone calls before the requisite 96 interviews were 
completed. Of these, 100 interviews were actually completed: three 
were replacements for those with subjects whose responses were 
identified as outliers by SYSTAT, and one was with a subject who 
called back after the quota had been reached but wanted an 
interview anyway. Thirty five physicians refused to be interviewed. 
Twelve did not return repeated telephone calls. Telephone numbers 
were not available for three of the physicians who were selected 
from the pool as potential subjects. 
-- ----- - -------
RESULTS 
The range of subjects' estimates of the probability of 
malignancy after hearing only the first part of the scenario was from 
2% to 100% (see Figure 1). The mean of all estimates was 50.3%. 
The magnitude of change in probability estimate (ChangeP) was 
calculated for each subject by using the formula 
ChangeP = l(PostP - PriorP)I 
where PostP and PriorP are the subject's estimates of posterior and 
pnor probabilities of malignancy. Means and standard deviations of 
these values are shown in Table I. A three-way analysis of variance 
was performed on ChangeP, using test result, sensitivity level, and 
specificity level as independent variables. The ANOV A showed a 
significant difference due to test result (F(l,88)=12.89, p<.001). No 
other effects were significant. 
A normative posterior probability value (N ormP) was 
calculated for each subject, using the appropriate form of the 
Bayesian equation (formulas 3a and 3b above) according to whether 
the mammogram result was "appears benign" (T-) or "appears 
malignant" (T + ). The values used were the stated sensitivity and 
specificity of the mammogram reading, and the subject's estimated 
prior probability of disease after hearing the first part of the 
scenario (PriorP). In the two cases in which prior probability was 
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estimated at 100%, the figure used for calculation was 99%. Figure 2 
shows a scatter plot of estimated posterior probability as a function 
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Figure 1. Prior probability of malignancy (PriorP), estimated 
after part one of the case scenario. 
TABLE 1 
MEANS (ST AND ARD DEVIATIONS) OF ABSOLUTE VALUE OF 
CHANGE FROM PRIOR PROBABILITY OF DISEASE TO 
POSTERIOR PROBABILITY OF DISEASE (CHANGEP) 
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Figure 2. Posterior probability of malignancy as estimated by 
subjects (PostP), as a function of that calculated by the 
Bayesian formula (NormP). 
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To compare with the ChangeP results and to describe the 
normative change for the subjects in this study, the absolute value of 
the normative change in probability for each subject (NormChng) was 
calculated by the formula 
NormChng = l(NormP - PriorP)I. 
A three-way analysis of variance showed that there would be 
significant main effects of test sensitivity (F(l ,88)=5.33, p<.025) and 
test specificity (F(l,88)=4.22, p<.05). There would be no significant 
difference attributable to test result as a main effect. As discussed 
earlier (see page 5), the two-way interactions between result and 
sensitivity (F(l ,88)=4. 72, p<.05) and result and specificity 
(F(l,88)=4.58, p<.05) would also be significant (see Figure 3). No 
other interactions would be significant. These results were not 
empirical, but indicate how normative behavior would appear in this 
subject population and with this design. Such an analysis was 






















Figure 3. Interactive effects of test result and sensitivity, and 
test result and specificity on the normative change in 
probability (NormChng). 
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For each subject, the degree of accuracy of change from pnor 
probability (PriorP) to posterior probability (PostP) was determined 
by comparing that change to the normative change in probability 
through the formula 
AccuProb = (PostP - PriorP) I (N ormP - PriorP). 
This value is simply the proportion of the normative change which 
each subject actually adjusted, and was computed in order to remove 
the effects of the variability in PriorP. Algebraic differences were 
used instead of absolute differences, to capture any instances in 
which subjects changed in the wrong direction. The four subjects 
who performed as Bayesians had scores of 1.00. The 42 who 
adjusted too far had scores of greater than 1.00; the 36 who 
underadjusted had scores of less than 1.00. Thirteen subjects did not 
change their probability estimates and had scores of 0. The one 
subject who revised in the wrong direction had a negative score. 
Table II shows the means and standard deviations of AccuProb 
values for the 12 subjects in each experimental condition. 
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TABLE II 
:MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF ACCUPROB--THE RATIO OF 
CHANGE FROM PRIOR PROBABILITY OF DISEASE TO POSTERIOR 
PROBABILITY OF DISEASE, TO THE CHANGE FROM PRIOR 
PROBABILITY TO NORMATIVE POSTERIOR 























Note: AccuProb = 1.000 means subject performed as a Bayesian 
Note: N = 12 in each cell .. 
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The three-way ANOV A on AccuProb showed significant main 
effects of test result and test specificity (see Table III). The two-way 
interaction between test result and specificity was also significant. 
Figure 4 shows a graph of the interactions. Subjects with a negative 
test result had a mean AccuProb of 0.705 for low specificity and 
0.684 for high specificity (t( 45)=0.12, p N.S.). Subjects who had a 
positive test result had a mean AccuProb of 1.607 for low specificity 
and 1.013 for high specificity (t(27)=2.92,p<.01). There were no 
significant effects attributable to sensitivity. 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON ACCUPROB 
Factor SS df MS F ratio 12. 
Result 9.093 1 9.093 21.07 <.001 
Sensitivity 0.017 1 0.017 0.04 N.S. 
Specificity 2.269 1 2.269 5.26 <.025 
Res X Sens 0.017 1 0.017 0.04 N.S. 
Res X Spec 1.970 1 1.970 4.56 <.05 
Sens X Spec 0.000 1 0.000 0.00 N.S. 
Res X Sens 
X Spec 0.416 1 0.416 0.96 N.S. 
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Thirty seven subjects were asked the question, "at what 
probability of cancer would your treatment plan change from just 
'watchful waiting' to actually doing something?" Four subjects were 
unable to respond quantitatively to the question. Of the 33 subjects 
who did respond, the median probability was 10% (range = 01 % to 
95%). A value of 01 % was used to describe variations on the 
response, "at absolutely any probability." Using the median value of 
0.10 as a treatment threshold (that point at which treatment changes 
from waiting to action), the scatterplot in Figure 2 has been divided 
into four quadrants. Beginning at the lower left and reading 
clockwise, the quadrants indicate true wait, false treat, true treat, 
and false wait. Seventy two subjects fall in one of the "true" 
quadrants. Twelve subjects estimated a posterior probability of 
0.10, three subjects had NormP values of 0.10, and two subjects had 
both PostP and NormP equal to 0.10. Five subjects fell in the "false 
treat" quadrant and two in the "false wait" quadrant. 
Probabilities and thresholds were also compared individually 
for the 33 subjects who indicated treatment thresholds. Twenty six 
had estimated posterior probabilities which were on the same side of 
their own thresholds as their Bayesian probabilities. Four subjects 
estimated posterior probabilites that were the same as their 
thresholds: of these subjects, three had normative values below the 
threshold and one had a normative value above the threshold. Three 
subjects estimated posterior probabilites on the opposite side of the 
threshold as their normative probabilites, all errors being of the 
"false treat" type. 
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The mean level of confidence which all subjects expressed m 
their estimates of prior probability (PrConf) was 5.5 (range = 1 to 
10). The mean level of confidence in their estimates of posterior 
probability (PostConf) was 7.4 (range = 1 to 10). The change in 
confidence for each subject was determined by calculating 
ChngConf = (PostConf - PrConf). 
Means and standard deviations of these values for all conditions are 
shown in Table IV. A three-way analysis of variance (see Table V) 
showed a significant effect of test result. There was also a significant 
two-way interaction between test result and sensitivity. A graph of 
this interaction is shown in Figure 5. Subjects who had received 
negative results had a mean confidence change of 0.8 for low-
sensitivity tests and 1.4 for high-sensitivity tests (t(45)=-.84, p N.S.). 
Subjects who had received positive test results had a mean 
confidence change of 3.3 for low-sensitivity tests and 2.1 for high-
sensitivity tests (t( 44 )=2.48, p<.025). There were no effects on 
change in confidence attributable to specificity. 
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TABLE IV 
MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF CHNGCONF--THE CHANGE IN 
CONFIDENCE IN ESTIMATE OF POSTERIOR PROBABILITY 
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Note: N = 12 in each cell. 
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TABLE V 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON CHNGCONF 
Factor SS df MS F ratio p_ 
Result 63.375 1 63.375 13.06 <.001 
Sensitivity 2.042 1 2.042 0.42 N.S. 
Specificity 2.667 1 2.667 0.55 N.S. 
Res X Sens 20.167 1 20.167 4.16 <.05 
Res X Spec 0.042 1 0.042 0.01 N.S. 
Sens X Spec 5.042 1 5.042 1.04 N.S. 
Res X Sens 
X Spec 0.167 1 0.167 0.03 N.S. 
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Figure 5. Interactive effects of test result and sensitivity 
on change in confidence (ChngConf). 
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A Pearson product moment correlation was calculated between 
the 96 subjects' change in confidence (ChngConf) and the degree of 
accuracy of the posterior probability estimate (IAccuprob-1.0001). 
The result was not significant (r = -.15, 95% C.I. = -.34 to +.06, 
z = -1.41). 
Forty three subjects responded to the question regarding 
preference for a test with high sensitivity or one with high 
specificity. Thirty five were able to choose, although many were 
uncomfortable with the idea of a forced choice: of these, 18 chose 
high sensitivity and 17 chose high specificity. Seven subjects 
responded that it depends on the purpose of the test. One subject 
insisted that both are necessary. 
All subjects were asked whether sensitivity and specificity 
values were routinely available to them in practice. Sixty two said 
the values were not routinely available; 22 subjects said they were. 
Four subjects said the values were available if they looked for them. 
Four said it depends on the test and two said either sensitivity or 
specificity was available but not both. Two subjects said they didn't 
need sensitivity and specificity values. 
DISCUSSION 
The scatterplot in Figure 2 shows clearly that subjects in this 
study did not revise their probabilities as Bayesians, based on new 
information from the mammogram readings. The few subjects 
whose posterior probability estimates agreed with the Bayesian 
values are indicated by data points on the diagonal. Subjects who 
overestimated are above the diagonal and subjects who 
underestimated are below the diagonal. 
The results of the three-way analysis of variance performed on 
ChangeP also show that subjects did not process test results by the 
Bayesian model. In fact, they performed quite differently from the 
model, being influenced by test result and by nothing else. As seen 
by the analysis on the magnitude of the normative change 
(NormChng), there should be significant effects of sensitivity and 
specificity, with the higher levels of each one bringing about a 
greater change. The interactions between result X sensitivity and 
result X specificity show the different importances of sensitivity and 
specificity in the case of positive or negative results. There should 
be no effect of test result on the absolute value of the magnitude of 
the change. For the subjects in this study, however, the magnitude of 
probability adjustment appeared to be only a function of whether 
the test was positive or negative and had nothing to do with the 
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validity of the test. 
The analysis of AccuProb shows how well subjects estimated 
probability, relative to what they should have done by the Bayesian 
formula. These results show, as do the analyses on ChangeP, that 
subjects tended to overadjust or underadjust probability, depending 
on whether the test result was positive or negative. It would appear 
that different heuristics operate in each case. 
When test results were positive, subjects tended to 
overestimate the probability of disease. This would appear to be 
consistent with representativeness bias, in which outcomes are 
predicted as a function of their similarity to new information 
(Kahnemann & Tversky, 1973 ). When results were negative, 
however, probability revisions were underestimated. The 
phenomenon of "cognitive conservatism" is another example of non-
Bayesian probability revision, and appears consistent with the 
behavior of these subjects. Kozielecki (1970) discussed cognitive 
conservatism as a two-part phenomenon: (1) posterior probability is 
almost always adjusted in the proper direction from the prior 
probability, and (2) the change is almost always underestimated. In 
their study of nurses' revised estimates of the probability of disease, 
Hammond et al. (1967) also showed that subjects were conservative 
in their probability revisions. These authors used a measure of 
accuracy similar to the one used in this study (AccuProb), which they 
called the "accuracy ratio," the subjective log likelihood ratio divided 
by the Bayesian log likelihood ratio. 
The two different behaviors -- overadjustment when a test 1s 
positive and underadjustment when a test is negative -- result rn 
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both cases in an overestimated posterior probability of disease. This 
is consistent with a tendency to avoid false negative errors in 
medical diagnosis, and supports the theory that avoidance of this 
type of error is an important non-Bayesian component of medical 
diagnosis (Scheff, 1971). Bergman and Pantell (1986) showed that 
physicians increased their estimates of the posterior probability of 
disease after reading an article which discussed the complications of 
that disease but did not give any information which would change 
the probability values which they had already used in diagnosing. 
The results of the present study suggest that the high "cost" of a 
missed diagnosis of breast cancer affects the estimate of its presence. 
In other words, outcome values are being included in the estimate of 
probability. 
The results of this study suggest that the likelihood ratio 
fallacy (Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983) may also create a serious 
problem in medical diagnosis, as the effect of specificity on AccuProb 
indicates that subjects are not making normative use of specificity. 
Subjects with low specificity results overestimated the probability of 
malignancy relative to the Bayesian model (mean AccuProb = 1.156), 
while subjects who had high specificity results underestimated the 
probability (mean AccuProb = 0.849). Since there was no significant 
effect due to the levels of sensitivity, we may conclude that subjects 
understood better the statistical implications of sensitivity than they 
did of specificity. Since they were estimating the probability that 
cancer was present, and since the specificity is the complement of 
P(Hl-D) (the probability that a hypothesis is true, given the 
nonoccurrence of a datum), the likelihood ratio fallacy is shown in 
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the context of a commonly demanded professional task. 
Among subjects who received positive test results, the error of 
overestimation was significantly greater with low-specificity tests. 
This is because subjects tended to revise their probabilities the same, 
even though lower specificity causes a lower value in the 
denominator of AccuProb, resulting in a higher ratio. In other words, 
specificity appears to be ignored in the case of a positive test result. 
Specificity may also be ignored in the case of a negative test result, 
with lack of significant difference due to less impact of specificity on 
the denominator. It is important to note that the ANOV A on the 
normative change in probability (N ormChng) shows that the 
normative differences were small between conditions. This is 
because the ten-point range between sensitivity and specificity 
values of .91 and .81 did not provide wide variations in their effects. 
The AccuProb differences in this study would conceivably be even 
greater if the sensitivity and specificity values were farther apart, 
although this was not feasible in a mammogram scenario. 
The question of clinical importance is whether departure from 
Bayesian reasoning has any effect on a physician's treatment plan. 
The scatterplot in Figure 2 shows that 74 subjects (77%) fall either in 
one of the "true" quadrants or on the diagonal at the treatment 
threshold (0.10). We could assume that the treatment plans of these 
subjects would be appropriate for their normative probabilities as 
well as for their own estimates of posterior probability. For the 
remaining 22 subjects (23% ), however, there could conceivably be a 
change in treatment plan based on more accurate probability 
determination. Three subjects (3.1%) had NormP values of 0.10; all 
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of these subjects had estimated posterior probabilities greater than 
0.10. For these physicians, there is a danger of treating when it is 
not indicated. Twelve subjects (12.5%) estimated posterior 
probabilities of 0.10. Seven of these had NormP values less than 
0.10, again suggesting a danger of over treatment, while 3 had 
N ormP values greater than 0.10, suggesting danger of 
undertreatment. For all of these physicians, understanding that they 
were at the treatment threshold might help them design better 
treatment plans. Seven subjects (7 .3%) fell into the "false" 
quadrants--5 in the "false treat" and 2 in the "false wait." Therefore, 
using the median value of 10% as a treatment threshold, it appears 
that a better understanding of probabilistic reasoning could have a 
favorable impact on the treatment plans of 23% of the subjects in 
this study. It should be noted that moving the threshold toward 50% 
would result in more subjects in the "false" quadrants. A more 
central threshold would not be inconceivable in the case of less 
serious disease, which suggests that the impact of poor probabilistic 
reasoning may even be underestimated in this study. 
A closer look at the 33 subjects who indicated treatment 
thresholds indicates that better probability judgments could 
influence the treatment plans in 21 % of that subgroup. Three of 
these subjects estimated posterior probabilities on the opposite side 
of the treatment threshold from their normative probability. In all 
three cases, their estimated probability was higher than the 
normative, indicating a "false treat" error. Of the four subjects who 
indicated treatment threshold values that were the same as their 
estimated posterior probabilities, three had overestimated the 
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posterior probability of malignancy, and one had underestimated. 
Thus in six subjects (18%) there was an indication of overtreatment 
and in one (03%) subject an indication of undertreatment, due to lack 
of understanding of the statistics of probability. Based on these and 
the above findings, we conclude that at least 20% of physicians would 
benefit from better understanding of probabilistic reasoning in 
medical diagnosis. 
Although subjects did not use test results normatively to revise 
their estimates of the probability of malignancy, the mean value of 
confidence in their estimates increased after the results were 
received. This increase was almost two points on a scale of ten. The 
change in confidence was significantly affected by the type of test 
result, with subjects who had received a positive result being more 
confident in their revised estimates. This is despite the fact that 
they significantly overestimated on the basis of the positive result. 
The fact that there were no main effects on change of confidence due 
to sensitivity or specificity is inconsistent with the findings by 
Kahnemann and Tversky (1973 ), who found that increasing the 
perceived accuracy of new information increased subjects' confidence 
in their probability estimates. The fact that subjects who received 
positive results had significantly greater confidence increases when 
the sensitivity level of the test was low may be a spurious finding, 
attributable to the fact that almost 1/20 of all significance tests will 
have p<.05 due to chance alone. 
One of the most curious findings of this study is the wide 
variability of subjects' estimates of the prior probability of disease. 
The pilot study of part one of the scenario suggested that estimates 
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would generally fall within the range of 40% to 60%. Although the 
mean value of subjects in the study was the desired 50%, the range 
from 02% to100% was surprising. Figure 1 shows that subjects were 
distributed throughout the range. Two possible explanations for this 
variability are that the predictive values of historical and clinical 
indicators are not agreed upon, and that different physicians weight 
the factors differently in making their clinical judgments. This is 
clearly a topic for further exploration. 
How valid is a case-scenario study in determining professional 
performance by clinicians? One's ability as an intuitive statistician 
seems to vary with the context in which it is being used (Beyth-
Marom & Fischoff, 1983; Evans, Brooks, & Pollard, 1985). It is 
worthwhile to consider the conclusions of Goran, Williamson and 
Gonnella ( 1973 ), in which they point out that high scores on case-
scenario questions do not always mean better clinical ability, 
although low scores may very well indicate poor clinical ability. If 
anything, the findings of the present study may be an underestimate 
of errors in the real diagnostic setting. 
Practical Implications 
Available Information. Perhaps part of the problem is the fact 
that sensitivity and specificity concepts are not used much in an 
actual clinical setting. Only 23% of the subjects in this study felt that 
sensitivity and specificity values were routinely available to them in 
practice. This supports the findings of others -- that sensitivity and 
specificity values may be hard to get, and often the information 
46 
doesn't exist at all (Benish, 1985). In fact, in their experiment which 
demonstrated overreliance on test result information, Balla et al. 
(1983) gave only the sensitivity value of the test and withheld the 
specificity value, claiming that although "the data on test 
diagnosticity were formally insufficient, [this presentation was] 
consistent with common, everyday presentation of this information." 
(p. 25). 
Information in medical literature is also often of poor quality. 
Sheps and Schechter ( 1984) examined 129 articles in the medical 
literature using the following Medline criteria: the articles were 
written in English; they were published in 1982; the words 
"sensitivity" and "specificity" both appeared in the abstract, title, or 
key words; they were in journals cited in the abridged Index 
Medicus. The authors located 129 of the 151 articles disclosed by 
the Medline search, and assessed them against seven methodological 
criteria for test validation. Along with other methodological flaws, 
they found that in 21 % of them the terms "sensitivity" and 
"specificity" were used incorrectly. 
Eddy ( 1982) cites numerous examples from the literature 
which do not contain sufficient information for diagnosticity. This 
author also points out that retrospective accuracy (sensitivity and 
specificity) is often confused in the medical literature with predictive 
accuracy (positive and negative predictive values), and that medical 
authors often do not appear to understand the impact of prior 
probability (disease prevalence or prior probability for the patient) 
on the posterior probability of disease. Another problem in the 
medical literature is ambiguity of terms. For example, such terms as 
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"true positive rate" and "percent true positive" are often used 
without specifying the denominator (Dolan & Mushlin, 1985; Griner 
et al., 1981 ). Is the denominator all positive tests, all diseased 
individuals, or all tests administered? 
It has been estimated (Billings & Bernstein, 1985) that at least 
one article per month in the major medical journals requires 
understanding of probability concepts. The bad examples certainly 
do not constitute the whole of medical literature. There have been 
excellent contributions which recognize and explain the relationships 
between probability elements in medical diagnosis in terminology 
common to physicians with general-level knowledge of statistics 
(Connell & Koepsell, 1985; Griner et al., 1981; Sox, 1986). In fact, 
shortly after Sheps and Schechter published the findings discussed 
above (1984), Human Pathology cited the study and committed in an 
editorial to seek only papers that "adhere to the critical approach 
required for validity" (Wagner, 1985, p. 325). The editor claimed 
that, out of 14 papers which had been accepted in 1984 about new 
tests using primarily immunocytochemical methods, only six were 
accepted because of consideration of the issues raised by Sheps and 
Schechter. 
Training. Although subjects in this study may not have 
understood how to use sensitivity and specificity, they appeared to 
appreciate that those values were important. Those who were able 
to make a forced choice between high sensitivity and high specificity 
were evenly divided between their preferences. Some clearly 
understood that the two differ in importance according to the test's 
purpose (e.g. screening, where the prior probability is low, versus 
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confirmation of a diagnosis, where the prior probability is high). It is 
important to note, however, that some of these subjects had the 
importances of high sensitivity and high specificity reversed, 
advocating high sensitivity for screening and high specificity for 
confirmation of diagnosis. 
If physicians do not handle the concepts of conditional 
probability well, would this be helped by further training? The 
medical literature varies in its suggestions concerning this matter. 
Casscells et al. (1978) recommend instruction to physicians in the 
theory of test interpretation. Billings and Bernstein (1985) found 
that residents and medical students performed better than practicing 
physicians at determining the probability of disease after obtaining 
results of a diagnostic test, although the difference may have been 
overestimated due to the methodological flaws discussed earlier in 
this manuscript. In light of their findings, the authors suggested that 
probability concepts may be hard to retain when they are not 
actively used. Other physicians have concluded that there are 
benefits to statistical training. Borak and Veilleux (1982) found that 
statistically sophisticated physicians (SP) gave the highest percent of 
correct answers in probability judgment tasks, compared to 
practicing physicians, clinical nurses, and hospital laborers. The 
authors stressed, however, that the majority of responses were still 
incorrect in the SP group, and that their errors were distributed in 
patterns identical to the other three groups. The results of their 
study may suggest that only a few individuals benefit from 
conventional statistical training. A further study of interest would 
be to compare training techniques and learning styles of those who 
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retain statistical information with those who do not. Indeed, 
Doubilet and McNeil (1985) have suggested that we need more 
research into cognitive processes, in order to design effective training 
programs for physicians in handling probabilities. 
There are those, however, who would argue against the 
effectiveness of training (Balla et al., 1985). Bergman and Pantell 
(1986) found that recent training had no effect on how well 
physicians processed probability. Their study compared family 
practitioners, pediatric residents, and board-certified pediatricians. 
Another group of medical educators who studied the use of 
formalized decisions in clinical medicine (Schwartz et al, 1973) stated 
that their teaching experience showed that, although some physicians 
in training welcomed an analytical approach, others denied its 
usefulness, claiming that they could make good decisions informally. 
Borak and Veilleux (1982) felt that statistical training is not the best 
answer because intuitive reasoning skills are not made better by 
more education. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (197 4) found that 
experienced researchers were subject to the same judgment errors as 
lay persons. 
A particularly ingenious training device was described by 
Ledley and Lusted in their seminal article on the use of Bayesian 
reasoning in medical diagnosis ( 1959). This was a system of cards, 
each representing a possible diagnosis, sorted on indications by a 
pin-sort method similar to that which was used by many pre-
computer cataloguing systems. Since diagnostic possibilities were 
dependent on previous diagnoses, the authors recommended that 
only "carefully evaluated or definitely verified diagnoses should be 
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used in making up the deck, or at least there should be a provision 
for review and removal of incorrect diagnoses" (p. 20), lest the 
process become too cumbersome. The authors claimed that although 
their invention was "essentially an experimental tool,. .. undoubtedly 
more sophisticated forms of the device could be further developed" 
(p. 20). Indeed, more sophisticated forms have been developed, and 
we will discuss these below. 
Decision Aids. Beyth-Marom and Fischoff (1983) concluded 
that P(Dl-H) will be processed properly in updating probability, if it 
is presented with equal status as P(DIH). Indeed, it has been 
recommended that the likelihood ratio, the figure which incorporates 
both of these values, be promoted as an aid to decision making 
(Doubilet, 1983). Pascoe (1986) suggests that physicians should be 
taught to request the likelihood ratio along with test results, 
reminding readers of three important advantages to physicians: (1) 
Like sensitivity and specificity, it is calculated independently of the 
prior probability in the validation population. (2) It can be 
calculated at different levels of continuous-outcome test results, and 
thus can be used to make the decision regarding cutoff point 
between "positive" and "negative" results. (3) It can be used to 
construct graphic decision aids. It should be noted, however, that 
use of the likelihood ratio alone results in loss of information of the 
separate magnitudes of sensitivity and specificity. This information 
may be important in cases of very high or very low prior 
probabilities. 
Some medical literature pleads the case for large medical data 
bases to help with probability assessment (Doubilet & McNeil, 1985). 
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Others in the field have proposed mathematical aids. Connell and 
Koepsell ( 1985) designed an aid to deciding whether or not to test, 
which considers prior probability, test sensitivity and test specificity. 
Moller-Petersen (1985) recommended a rearranged formula to 
calculate the posterior probability of disease in "less than a minute" 
on a pocket calculator. The formula does not appear any less 
confusing than Bayes' equation, however, and in fact it seems less 
intuitively obvious. Furthermore, one who understands the Bayesian 
formula should be able to calculate a posterior probability on a 
pocket calculator in less than 30 seconds. 
In their early article about the use of decision analysis in 
medicine, Schwartz et al. ( 1973) maintained that a computerized 
approach was the most promising direction in aids to clinical decision 
making, as it will continue to remain unlikely that clinicans will have 
time to perform elaborate analyses themselves. Borak and Veilleux 
( 1982) also concluded that the best answer is probably to design 
ways of making probability calculations for clinicans, instead of 
trying to train them to make their own. This may, indeed, be the 
best hope for improving the clinical processing of probabilies, and is 
a growing trend in the literature. For example, one medical journal 
recently published a simple program written in BASIC for revising 
probability of disease after receiving a test result, on the basis of 
sensitivity, specificity, and pre-test probability of disease (Schechter 
& Sheps, 1985). Using the computer would certainly open the way to 
more sophisticated use of available diagnostic information. For 
example, Doubilet and McNeil (1985) point out that the use of the 
computer will make possible a "probabilistic sensitivity analysis", 
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providing the potential for stating with certainty that a selected test 
or test strategy is optimal. 
Graphic Aids. Benish (1985) affirmed that a graphic aid 
"presents a last refuge for those physicians who want to practice 
good medicine without walking around with a calculator on their 
belts" (p. 34 ), and then presented one to calculate posterior 
probability of disease, given the prior probability, test result, test 
sensitivity, and test specificity. A less sophisticated one had been 
proposed eleven years earlier by Katz ( 197 4 ), who designed a 
graphic aid to calculate the posterior probability of disease based on 
a positive result from an "extremely sensitive" test (defined as being 
"close to 1.0"), as a function of prior probability and test specificity. 
Specificity was actually stated as its complement, the "false positive 
frequency" of the test. A nomogram for calculating posterior 
probability of disease based on the prior probability of disease and 
the likelihood ratio of a given positive or negative test result has also 
been published in the medical literature several times in recent 
years (Fagan, 1975; Moller-Petersen, 1985; Pascoe, 1986). 
Graphic aids to diagnosis may also lead the way for more 
sophisticated decision-making aids which could be carried in busy 
clinicians' pockets. Doubilet (1983) suggests that mathematic and 
graphic models would be useful to help the physician make the 
following decisions, based on probabilities: (1) Should a test be 
done?; (2) Which test should be done, if more than one test is 
available? (3) In a test with continuous results, what is the best 
cutoff point for dichotomization of the results (for example, into 
"positive" and "negative")? Furthermore, by using graphic aids to 
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make these decisions, the way is opened for the incorporation of 
outcome values into the clinical decision making process, bringing 
closer the use of more comprehensive aids such as decision trees. 
Fischoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) have enumerated three 
ways decision makers may deal with the complexity brought by the 
conditional nature of events, each one resulting in a fallacy: (1) 
ignoring the conditional nature of the events, (2) confusing the roles 
of the datum and the hypothesis, and (3) just feeling confused. The 
first fallacy is analogous in medical diagnosis to ignoring the separate 
roles of sensitivity and specificity in the accuracy of the test result, 
as a function of whether the disease is actually present or absent. 
The second fallacy is analogous to confusing sensitivity and 
specificity with posterior probabilities of disease. The third may 
relate to a rejection of these statistical procedures in clinical 
medicine. It may be the third consequence which leads to 
admonishments against viewing the Bayesian model as a substitute 
for clinical skill (Balla et al., 1985). 
Eddy (1982) cites examples of medical maxims which illustrate 
the diversity of opinions and feelings of medical professionals 
regarding the use of statistics in clinical medicine. Those who 
advocate Bayesian reasoning might say "Common things occur most 
commonly," "Follow Sutton's law: go where the money is" or "When 
you hear hoofbeats, think of horses, not of zebras." On the other 
hand, those who oppose Bayesian inference in clinical medicine might 
say "The patient is a case of one" or "Statistics are for dead men" (p. 
259). The battle to introduce normative probability rev1s10n 
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techniques into the process of medical diagnosis may not be without 
its allies, but it will probably be hard won. In any case, this study 
shows that there is much room for improvement, and that such 
improvement would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
many physicians' treatment plans. 
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APPENDIX A. 
LEITER TO :MEMBERS OF SUBJECT POOL 
m 
THE OREGON 
HEALTH SCIENCES UNIVERSITY 
AD 3181 S.W. Sam Jackson Parle Road Portland, Oregon 97201 (503) 279-7590, 279-5321 
Dr. name and address 
Dear Dr. name: 
Departmeral qf Family Medicine 
School of Medicine 
Within a week or two, you may receive a telephone call from Portland as part of 
a research project to study how physicians make clinical judgments. As these 
processes become better understood, it will become possible to improve our 
methods of professional education and to design aids for diagnostic reasoning 
for physicians in training and in practice. 
We are writing in advance of our telephone call because we have found that many 
people appreciate being advised that a research study is in process and that 
they will be called. You are one of 200 active members of the Oregon Academy 
of Family Physicians who have been randomly selected for a pool of potential 
subjects. Physicians will be contacted from this pool until 96 interviews have 
been completed. 
When our interviewer calls, she or he will ask to speak to you in connection 
with this study. If you are busy at the time and would prefer the interviewer 
to call back, please convey that message through your receptionist. We will be 
happy to call back at whatever time would be convenient for you. Altogether, 
the interview should be take less than ten minutes. Your name will not be 
recorded by the interviewer, so your responses to the questions will be 
anonymous. 
Your help and that of the other physicians being asked to participate in this 
study of clinical decision making is essential to the project's success. We 
greatly appreciate it. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask our interviewer. If 
you prefer, you may contact me by telephone at 279-7855 or by mail. 
Sincerely, 
Ann Sinclair 
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SUBJECT NUMBER: YOB=_~TELEPHONE NUMBER·~------------
lNTERVlEWER-__ DATE TIME BEGAN: TIME ENDED= ___ _ 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
"THIS IS . I'M CALLING FROM THE OREGON HEALTH SCIENCES UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY MEDICINE. MAi I PLEASE SPEAK WITH DR. ?" 
[CALL BACK APPOINTMENT=~--------------~ 
COTHER NOTES'-----------------------
"THIS IS , FROM THE OREGON HEALTH SCIENCES UNIVERSITY [OHSUJ 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY MEDICINE. WE SENT YOU A LETTER ABOUT A TELEPHONE 
SURVEY WE'RE CONDUCTING ON CLINICAL DECISION MA~:ING. THE QUESTIONS INVOLVE 
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE SCENARIO, AND SHOULD TAKE LESS THAN 5 MINUTES. IS THIS 
A CONVENIENT TIME FOR YOU?" 
[CALL SAC~: APPOINTMENT'----------------
COTHER NOTES=---------------------
"THIS IS A 50 YEAR OLD WHITE FEMALE PATIENT WHOM YOU HAVE NEVER SEEN. SHE 
HAS COME TO SEE YOU BECAUSE OF A BREAST LUMP THAT SHE HAS NOTICED WITHIN 
THE LAST COUPLE OF WEEKS. THE LUMP IS PAINLESS. SHE HAS NO FAMILY HISTORY 
OF BREAST CANCER. SHE IS MARRIED AND HAS ONE ADULT SON. 
ON PHYSICAL EXAMINATION, YOU FIND A ONE-CENTIMETER, HARO MASS WITH WELL-
OEFINEO, REGULAR BORDERS. THE MASS IS LOCATED IN THE UPPER DUTE~ QUADRANT 
OF HER LEFT BREAST. 
AT THIS POINT, r·o LIKE TO AS~ YOU WHAT YOU THINK IS THE PR05A6ILITY THAT 
THE MASS IS MALIGNANT?" 
[INTERVIEWER MAY REPEAT ANY OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION. ANY ADDITIONAL 
INFO IS "NOT AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME."] 
____________ [MUST BE EXPRESSED r.JUMERICALLYl 
"HAVING ESTIMATED THE PROBABILITY OF MALIGNANCY, HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT 
YOUR ESTIMATE IS CORRECT? PLEASE EXPRESS THIS VALUE ON A SCALE FROM l TO 
10, WHERE '1' IS JUST A GUESS AND '10' IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN: 
______ [SCALE OF 1 TO 101 
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APPENDIXC 
TELEPHONE SCENARIO, PART TWO (EXAMPLE) 
"YOU HAVE DECIDED TO ORDER A MAMMOGRAM FOR YOUR PATIENT. ONCE THIS IS 
COMPLETED, THE RADIOLOGIST SENDS YOU A REPORT STATING THAT THE LESION 
APPEARS BENIGN. THE REPORT ALSO STATES THAT, IN YOUR HOSPITAL, 91X OF 
SUBSEQUENTLY PROVEN BREAST CANCERS ARE READ ON MAMMOGRAM AS "MALIGNANT" ANO 
91% OF SUBSEQUENTLY PROVEN NONCANCEROUS LESIONS ARE READ AS "BENIGN.• IN 
OTHER WORDS, THE SENSITIVITY IS 914 ANO THE SPECIFICITY IS 9li. 
NOW THAT YOU HAVE THESE RESULTS, I'D LIKE YOU TO ESTIMATE AGAIN THE 
PROBABILITY THAT THE LESION IS MALIGNANT. 
[MAY REPEAT ANY OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING PART lJ 
____________ [MUST BE EXPRESSED NUMERICALLY] 
"ONCE AGAIN, HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU THAT YOUR ESTIMATE IS CORRECT? PLEASE 
EXPRESS ON A SCALE FROM 1 TO 10, WHERE '1' IS JUST A GUESS AND '10' IS 
ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN:" 
_______ [SCALE OF l TO 10] 
*** 
"ALTHOUGH YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE CODED ANONYMOUSLY, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A 
FEW DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS TO HELP US DESCRIBE OUR DATA SAMPLE." 
WHAT YEAR DID YOU GRADUATE FROM MEDICAL SCHOOL? ___ _ 
HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN IN PRACTICE? ______ _ 
ARE SENSITIVITY ANO SPECIFICITY VALUES ROUTINELY AVAILABLE TO YOU? 
_NO _YES 
COMMENTS? _________________________ _ 
[OK TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AT THIS POINT. STUDY IS LOOKING AT HOW INFORMATION 
ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY ANO SPECIFICITY OF A LABORATORY VALUE IS USED, ALONG 
WITH THE RESULT OF THE TEST. IN THIS CASE, THE TEST IS MAMMOGRAPHY, 
ALTHOUGH WE'RE INTERESTED IN OTHER LABORATORY TESTS AS WELL.] 
"WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING A REPORT OF THE STUDY WHEN IT IS 
WRITTEN" 
_NO _YES--NAME =------------------
"THE LAST THING I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU IS NOT TO DISCUSS THIS INTERVIEW WITH 
ANY OF YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR AT LEAST A MONTH, BECAUSE THEY MAY BE ON OUR 
LIST OF POTENTIAL SUBJECTS TO CALL." 
•THANI< YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME.• 
